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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a component-based design
methodology and present a practical analysis approach that
makes use of the modular nature of component-based de-
signs to alleviate the state space explosion problem, a well-
known obstacle to system veriﬁcation. In addition, the ap-
proach is illustrated by application to a non-trivial case
study: the production cell. It is shown that not only the basic
consistency property, viz. the freedom from unexpected re-
ception and deadlock, but also other important safety prop-
erties in the design can be proved.
1. Introduction
In recent years, component-based software development
has become more popular for the production of large-scale
software applications. By building systems from inde-
pendently developed components, a promising means of
achieving software reuse, rapid development and complex-
ity management is provided. However, as noted in [3]:
“system complexity, and hence the likely num-
ber of design errors, grows exponentially with the
number of interacting system components”.
This is a consequence of the well-known state space ex-
plosion problem and it largely limits the applicability of
exhaustive analysis. To overcome this problem, various
reduction techniques have been proposed in the literature.
Among them, modular analysis (or compositional reason-
ing) [2, 7, 10, 11, 15, 20] is a powerful divide-and-conquer
technique for decomposing the analysis task of a system
into subtasks of individual components of the system. The
key to this is to consider each component in conjunction
with assumptions about the context of the component, and
to consider the composition of components in conjunction
with the interface behaviour of components.
In component-based systems, however, this key informa-
tion is often missing or only informally described. Cur-
rently, the interface speciﬁcations of components tend to
be rather restricted, capturing only the signatures, i.e. the
names, data types and direction of information ﬂow, but
excluding information about the communication protocols
of components. This is because software engineers lack a
formal means for precisely specifying the interfaces behind
which components encapsulate their services. As a result,
components cannot be analysed independently due to the
lack of information about the environments in which they
are embedded, and the composition of components cannot
be analysed due to the lack of rigorous speciﬁcation of the
interface behaviour of components.
We have developed a formal technique which focuses on
communication protocols while abstracting away from the
data values being communicated. The protocol of a compo-
nent describes the services it provides, the way it reacts to its
inputs and what it expects from its environment. It does not,
however, disclose the implementation detail of the compo-
nent. We use interface automata (IAs), a formal lightweight
language proposed in [5], as the notation for describing pro-
tocols.
With the contextual assumptions captured by an inter-
face automaton (IA), each component can be checked for
conformance with the IA in isolation from the system. This
ensures that a component is able to abide by the interaction
protocol given by the IA, provided its environment behaves
as expected. Furthermore, the composition of components
can be analysed utilising the interface behaviour of com-
ponents speciﬁed by the IAs while disregarding the internal
activities of components. Using this divide-and-conquer ap-
proach, the state space explosion problem can be alleviated.
This paper focuses on the application of the above tech-
nique to a non-trivial case study. The formal presentation
of this technique and comparison with related techniques is
found elsewhere [14, 15]. The technique has been imple-
mented in the context of the Moses tool suite [6], which
presents an additional challenge to component-based devel-
opment in that it supports the modelling and simulation of
heterogeneous discrete-event systems, where components
are modelled by different languages [6, 12, 13], e.g. pro-
cess networks, Petri nets, Statecharts, etc.
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The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, this
research is compared with related work. Our approach to
component-based design and analysis is presented in sec-
tion 3 and is applied to the production cell case study in
section 4. Finally, section 5 contains the conclusions.
It should be emphasised that throughout this paper the
word analysis is used in the sense of verifying system prop-
erties rather than in any sense of requirements elicitation.
2. Related work
Many authors have contributed to the production cell
case study, e.g. [16, 8, 9, 17]. Among these contributions,
the closest to our approach is the work in [8, 9], where a
detailed model of the production cell is found. Our design
builds on this model but segments it into 7 loosely-coupled
reusable components. Also, that work differs from ours in
the analysis method employed. There, the analysis was di-
rectly conducted on the state space of the whole system with
the help of reduction techniques such as stubborn set meth-
ods. In our work, the costly construction of the system state
space is avoided. Instead, system properties are proved on
the basis of independentmodel-checking of a group of small
state spaces with the help of interface automata.
In [17], a design and veriﬁcation approach to the produc-
tion cell using UML is presented. There, components are
modelled as UML Statecharts and the veriﬁcation is con-
ducted using the vUML tool which invokes the SPIN tool
for executing the model checking task. As in [8, 9], this
approach employs reduction techniques in order to explore
all possible states of the system. This, however, trades time
for memory. In contrast, our approach requires much less
time and memory due to the smaller state spaces that need
to be handled. Furthermore, our approach is not dedicated
to a particular modelling language, but accommodates var-
ious notations for modelling components, including UML
Statecharts [13].
In [16] there is a collection of other contributions and
also a detailed comparative survey. To the best of our
knowledge, there exists no other approach to the modular
analysis of the production cell.
3. An approach to component-based design
and analysis
When designing a system, an important step in decom-
posing the system into components is to specify the inter-
action protocols for components. These protocols serve as
the contract between the system and components and guide
component development. However, in the current practice
of component-based development, software engineers often
lack a formal means to capture protocols and instead use in-
formal languages to express them. As a consequence, the
correctness of component implementations is ensured only
by the experience of the engineers, testing or some infor-
mal reasoning against the protocols. This approach is often
error-prone with the design of the intermediate protocols
providing no means of precise analysis.
By contrast, we introduce interface automata (IAs) [5] as
a formal language that can describe the interaction protocol
of every component at a high level of abstraction. The pro-
tocol includes not only how a component produces outputs
in response to its inputs but also assumptions that the com-
ponent makes on the environment as to when or what inputs
are expected. The protocol, on the other hand, abstracts
away the implementation details of the component, such as
data values and internal behaviours. According to its pro-
tocol, a component can then be independently implemented
and analysed.
The introduction of IAs breaks the system analysis task
into a series of smaller tasks. Firstly, the conformance of
each component with its associated IA is ensured, i.e. every
component communicates with the environment in a way
that conforms to the interaction protocol deﬁned by its IA.
Secondly, the consistency property of the system, viz. the
freedom from deadlock and unexpected reception, can be
determined by checking the compatibility of the interface
automata. The compatibility refers to unspeciﬁed reception
in an abstract system composed of these IAs. Because of the
abstraction from components to their interface behaviour,
the state space of the abstract system is much smaller than
the component system. Hence the state space explosion
problem is alleviated.
On the other hand, also due to the abstraction, safety
properties dependent on the internal behaviour of compo-
nents cannot be directly checked on the abstract system. We
shall show that these properties can be proved by checking
the state combinations of components deduced from the ab-
stract system and individual component state spaces.
3.1. Interface automata
The IAs used here are deterministic ﬁnite state machines
(FSMs) where input and output events are distinguished.
The distinction reﬂects the fact that in asynchronous sys-
tems a component has control over its outputs but no con-
trol over its inputs. That is, a component decides when to
produce an output, while the environment decides when an
input event occurs.
Figure 1 shows an example IA, where bullets and arcs
represent states and steps (or transitions), respectively. The
state having an incoming arrow with no source denotes the
initial state. Each transition is labelled by an event. For
example, the IA has two input events “a” and “b” and an
output event “c”. This example IA speciﬁes the interaction
protocol for an adder component.
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Figure 1. An adder IA
The information contained in an IA is twofold. On the
one hand, it restricts the output events that a component im-
plementing it can produce in a particular state. On the other
hand, it captures the designer’s expectation that the environ-
ment should never provide an unspeciﬁed input event to the
component. For example, ﬁgure 1 states that the environ-
ment can deliver a and b only once before c is produced.
Also, it guarantees that the component does not produce c
until both a and b have occurred.
3.2. Components
In this context, components are (ﬁnite) state machines
assumed to communicate through input/output ports by dis-
crete events. They consume data fed to input ports and pro-
duce data via output ports. An input/output event of the
component refers to an occurrence of message transfer at
one of its ports. Also, like [18, chapter 8], a component
is required to be input-universal, i.e. it never refuses an in-
put, so that writing to a component never blocks. This ac-
knowledges the fact that components are often developed to
function properly in unknown environments. This is also a
requirement for independent deployment of components.
Let an IA event represent a class of component events as-
sociated with a particular port. Then we are able to use IAs
to describe both the required interface behaviour and the en-
vironment assumptions of components. More speciﬁcally,
an component event is considered to be a tuple 〈e, v〉 with e
an IA event (thus a component port) and v a parameter (the
data being communicated). We abbreviate such an event as
e.v. The parameter can be arbitrary for a component input
event, while for a component output event it is ﬁxed and
determined by the internal logic of the component. The as-
sociation between IAs and components makes it possible
to develop and analyse each component independently of
other components and the ultimate context.
For example, we can develop an adder component or se-
lect one from the component library, according to the pro-
tocol speciﬁed by ﬁgure 1. Suppose we obtain the model
shown in ﬁgure 2. The model is written in a variant of high-
level Petri nets [12], where triangles represent the input and
output ports and the body is given in the usual Petri net
notation with circles, boxes and arcs representing places,
transitions and the ﬂow relationships, respectively. From
the component perspective, an input port represents a (Petri
b: [0..N]









Figure 2. An adder component
net) transition of the environment which can ﬁre only when
expected by the IA and thus put a token into the connected
place, while an output port represents a place of the envi-
ronment for holding the tokens generated by the connected
transition. The ports are typed with “[0..N ]”, meaning that
in this example only tokens with integer values between 0
and a constant N can be transmitted via the ports.
3.3. Conformance checking of components
After a component is developed in this way, we need to
make certain that the component does conform to the pro-
tocol speciﬁed by the IA. As the component is always as-
sumed to run in a system where the input assumptions cap-
tured by the IA are respected, the conformance ensures that
the component does not violate the output guarantees spec-
iﬁed by the IA.
To do so, we ﬁrst build the least helpful but adequate
environment for the component from the IA speciﬁcation.
This is the environment that will not contradict the assump-
tions of the IA and such that any other suitable environment
will be more helpful, i.e. it will supply less inputs to the
component and will accept more outputs from the compo-
nent. The environment also includes trap steps taken when
a component violates the output guarantees speciﬁed by the
IA, i.e. it produces an output event which is unspeciﬁed at
a corresponding state of the IA. We refer to such an en-
vironment as the most abstract implementation of the mir-
ror of the IA. For example, such an environment for the
adder component is shown as a compact FSM in ﬁgure 3,
where gray arcs represent trap steps, ⊥ a single trap state,











Figure 3. The least helpful environment
We then construct the local state space of the component
paired with this least helpful environment. This will syn-
chronise output events with input events between the com-
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ponent and the environment. The states are tuples 〈s, q〉
with s a IA state or s = ⊥ and q a component state, and
the initial state is a tuple of the initial states of the IA and
the component. We can now determine the conformance of
the component by checking the absence of trap states, states
〈s, q〉 with s = ⊥, and deadlocks in the local state space.
<s0, (_, _)> <s2, (N, 0)>









Figure 4. Local state space of ﬁgure 2
For example, the local state space of the adder compo-
nent with respect to the adder IA is illustrated in ﬁgure 4.
The initial state is 〈s0, ( , )〉, where s0 is the initial state of
the IA and ( , ) is the marking of the component, indicat-
ing that there are no tokens in either place pa or place pb. In
this state, the environment is expected to provide an integer
v only via port a. As v can lie between 0 and N , there are
N input steps emanating from the state, each receiving an
event a.v with distinct v. Take the step receiving a.0 as an
example. The step ends at a state 〈s1, (0, )〉, where place
pa holds a token with value 0. Likewise, this state also has
N outgoing steps. If event b.0 is triggered, state 〈s2, (0, 0)〉
is entered, where both pa and pb hold a token of value 0.
At this time, transition “add” in the component will be en-
abled and, if ﬁred, will produce an output event c.0 with 0
representing the sum of tokens received via a and b. The re-
sultant state is the initial state. For brevity, we only expose
a small portion of the local state space and omit the rest due
to the structural similarity. As the local state space does not
involve a trap state and is deadlock-free, we know that the
adder component conforms to the adder IA.
3.4. Component-based designs
A typical component-based design process combines
top-down and bottom-up design. Components are identi-
ﬁed during system decomposition. IAs are then used to
specify the interaction protocols for the components and to
design the synchronisation patterns between components.
The synchronisation patterns relate the output events to the
input events of the IAs, while abstracting away the data be-
ing communicated. These resultant protocol speciﬁcations
are then used for developing or selecting suitable compo-
nents (or for further decomposition). Once the components
have been developed or selected, they can then form a con-
crete component-based design, where the synchronisation
patterns of IAs are reused for components with the incorpo-
ration of data values.
As an example, suppose two components, a user and an
adder, are identiﬁed in a small adder system. We expect
them to follow the protocols described in ﬁgures 1 and 6,
respectively, and to synchronise as described in ﬁgure 5.
In this case, an input event of one IA is synchronised with
an output event of the other with the same name, e.g. “a?”
of the adder with “a!” of the user. Using these protocols,
we develop two components shown in ﬁgures 2 and 7, and
connect them as shown in ﬁgure 5 to form the adder system.
The user component randomly chooses two integers from
place “nums” and provides them to the adder component
for computation. Place “nums” initially holds all integers
between 0 and N .
Since the IAs capture the interaction protocols expected
by the designer of the components, we need to ensure that
the components indeed follow these protocols in the execu-
tion of the ultimate system design. In other words, every
input/output step of a component in the system corresponds
to a step of its associated IA, ignoring the data being com-
municated. This property is called the freedom from unex-
pected reception. We also need to ensure that the system
design is free from deadlock. A component-based design
satisfying these is called consistent.
3.5. Analysis of system properties
The conformance of every component to its correspond-
ing IA makes it possible to determine the system consis-
tency property from an abstract system of IAs. The abstract
system is an intermediate product we have obtained in an
earlier design stage, and shares the same synchronisation
patterns with the component-based system. In the system,
an enabled output event of an IA is synchronised with all
the input events of others related by a synchronisation pat-
tern. The system is consistent if two conditions are satisﬁed.
On the one hand, all constituent IAs are compatible, that is,
no IA can produce an output event triggering an input event
unspeciﬁed at the current state of of another IA. This is also
called the freedom from unspeciﬁed reception. On the other
hand, the abstract system is free from deadlock, that is, there
is no deadlocked state in its state space (which is a FSM).
It has been proved by the authors in [15] that the consis-
tency of the abstract system can then serve as a sufﬁcient
condition for the consistency of the concrete system.
For instance, the IA system of the adder system consists
of the IAs in ﬁgures 1 and 6 and has the synchronisation
patterns shown in ﬁgure 5. Its state space looks like ﬁgure 1
except that all events are internal. It is easy to see that the
IA system is consistent. Therefore so is the adder system.
It should be noted that the example system is too small to
demonstrate signiﬁcant state space reduction using the pro-
posed method.
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Figure 6. A user IA










Figure 7. A user component
To determine safety properties other than the above, we
have extended our work in [14, 15]. We have proved that lo-
cal safety properties that are satisﬁed in the local state space
of a component are also satisﬁed in a consistent system con-
sisting of the component, as the assumptions captured in the
speciﬁcation IA are always respected in the system. These
local properties are also called component invariants. The
boundedness property of a system is a typical application
of this theory, as it is the conjunction of the boundedness
of all the components within the system, which is in turn
a special component invariant. We have also justiﬁed that
system safety properties can be ensured by proving the de-
composition of the properties on the local state spaces of
the involved components. We examine this in more detail
in section 4.2.
3.6. Overview of the implementation
This approach is aimed at promoting a practical means
for designing and analysing component-based systems. To
achieve this, tool support is of great importance. Due to
its extensibility, the Moses tool suite was chosen to be the
implementation framework for the proposed methods.
The Moses tool suite addresses the deﬁnition of a cer-
tain class of visual languages and supports the visual mod-
elling and simulation of discrete-event systems. A variety
of notations can be used for describing components in such
a system, e.g. Petri nets, Statecharts and process networks.
This is made possible by Moses generic tools, such as a
graph editor and a simulator, which are parametrised by vi-
sual language deﬁnitions.
On the basis of the Moses framework, we have encoded
the formalism of IAs and developed tools for their compo-
sition and compatibility checking. We have also provided
a tool for generating the local state space and thus the con-
formance checking of components coded in the pre-existing
formalisms. In addition, we have integrated a small prop-
erty speciﬁcation language into the Moses so that safety
properties can be speciﬁed. These include component in-
variants and system safety properties. Component invari-
ants can be automatically checked using a newly-built state
space exploration tool. As noted previously, this only re-
quires the exploration of component local state spaces. The
extensions for automatically checking more general system
safety properties is currently under development.
The Moses tool suite is available at [1]. The tools imple-
menting the techniques described in this paper are available
in a side branch of the repository and will soon be merged
into the main branch. In the meantime contact the authors
for access.
4. Case study: the production cell
The production cell case study, posed in [16], was de-
rived from a metal processing plant. The main task of the
cell is to forge metal blanks in a press. The blanks are trans-
ported to and removed from the press through the collabo-
ration of ﬁve other components in the cell: a feed belt, an
elevating rotary table, a robot with two extendable arms, a
deposit belt and a travelling crane. Figure 8 shows the top
view of the cell (taken from [8]).
Figure 8. Top view of the production cell
The production cycle of a metal blank is as follows:
When the feed belt conveys the blank to the table, the ta-
ble rotates and lifts the blank to a position where the robot
can pick it up using one of its arms. After the robot moves
the blank to the press, the press forges the blank and then
goes to a position where the robot can pick it up using the
other arm. The robot then removes the pressed blank and
5
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Figure 9. Architecture of the production cell
puts it onto the deposit belt, which transports it to the end.
The system is made closed and self-contained by the addi-
tion of the crane which fetches the blank from the end of the
deposit belt and returns it to the beginning of the feed belt.
The difﬁculty of designing the cell lies in the fact that the
cell involves 14 sensors and 13 actuators distributed over
the six components. A component learns its current posi-
tion by reading from its sensors and transports (or forges)
the blank by controlling its actuators. The control of the ac-
tuators involves 34 commands in total [8, 9]. For example,
the feed belt transports and delivers blanks to the table by
starting or stopping its motor (or actuator). In order to avoid
a blank being dropped outside the safe area, the belt is also
equippedwith a sensor detecting the arrival and departure of
a blank at the end. The robot is the most complex with ﬁve
groups of actuators and sensors in charge of arm extension
and retraction, blank grasp, and horizontal rotation.
4.1. Modular design
This design is based on the Petri net model proposed by
Heiner and Deussen [8, 9]. Figure 9 depicts the architec-
ture of the design in a dataﬂow network. Each component
in the cell corresponds to a component in the design ex-
cept the robot. In [8], the robot in the cell was designed
as two arm components, each of which involves a control
logic for swivelling the robot to its loading or unloading an-
gle. This is counter-intuitive to a component-based system
view. Instead, we build an additional component “robot”
which is in charge of robot swivel at the request of the two
arms. This makes the arms identical and thus helps produce
reusable implementations. The concrete robot now corre-
sponds to three components in the design: “arm1”, “arm2”
and “robot”. To simplify matters, we only deal with a closed
system with ﬁve blanks initially residing in the feed belt, the
table, the press, the deposit belt and the crane. Other vari-
ants of the system can be analysed in the same way.
4.1.1. Protocols
To coordinate the concurrent execution of components, we
follow Heiner and Deussen’s approach [8], i.e. components
communicate according to the producer-consumer protocol.
Figure 10(a) show the protocol speciﬁcation IA for both the
feed belt and the deposit belt, where the event “Ifull” (or
“Ifree”) locks (or unlocks) the input region for blanks and
the event “Ofull” (or “Ofree”) unlocks (or locks) the out-
put region. The IA speciﬁes the need of the feed/deposit
belt for simultaneous control of input and output regions for
blanks [8]. In other words, the belts cannot convey blanks


























Figure 10. feed & deposit belt IA
Because of the reactive nature of IAs, the interleaving
of input and output events often makes IA graphs messy,
sometimes even for such simple protocols. To improve
upon this we introduce a “save” attribute for states to spec-
ify an input event, indicating that the event is acceptable but
its processing is irrelevant to the current activities. For ex-
ample, the IA in ﬁgure 10(a) can be alternatively depicted
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as in ﬁgure 10(b), where states which model the input of ir-
relevant events, e.g. s4 and s5, are removed and saved at the
source states. As a result, the graph is neater and easier to
understand the main factors conveyed by the protocol. Note








(a) table & press
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Save: Ofree? Save: Ofree? Save: Ofree?Save: Ofree?
Save: Ifull?






























Figure 11. Interaction protocols
Apart from the above, there are also two variants of
the producer-consumer protocol shown in ﬁgures 11(a) and
11(b). Figure 11(a) states that the table/press must exclu-
sively handle inputs or outputs. That is, they need to lock
the input regions in order to change positions. As shown in
ﬁgure 11(b), the crane needs only an independent control of
its input and output regions. Put differently, it requires only
one lock at a time to do its work.
To communicate with the neighbouring components,
arms also follow the protocol as shown in ﬁgure 11(b).
In addition, they coordinate with the robot component un-
der a resource sharing protocol as depicted in ﬁgures 11(c)
and 11(d). The protocol ensures that the sensitive opera-
tions, such as blank pickup, putdown and robot swivel, can
be exclusively and atomically executed without interrup-
tion. Basically, a semaphore is exchanged between them
so that only one component, the one with the semaphore,
can conduct a sensitive operation. Initially, the robot owns
the semaphore. An arm can ask for the semaphore by send-
ing a request via “Lreq” or “Ureq”. The request also in-
dicates the angle at which the arm wants the robot to be,
e.g. “Lreq” (or “Ureq”) for the loading (or unloading) angle
of the arm. Once the robot has swivelled to the requested
angle, it hands over the semaphore to the arm by sending
“Lack” or “Uack”. When the arm ﬁnishes the sensitive op-
eration, it returns the semaphore via “Lﬁn” or “Uﬁn”. Fur-
thermore, upon receiving a request, the robot may process
it immediately or buffer it for later processing. When both
arms request the semaphore at the same time, the robot will
choose which one to serve. The actions taken depend on
the current angle of the robot and the availability of the
semaphore.
4.1.2. Components
With the interface automata formally describing the inter-
action protocol of components, we can now independently
design a component with respect to an IA. Black-token Petri
nets are used here as the modelling language. Although
the components implement different logic for controlling
actuators and sensors and collaborating with other compo-
nents, they have similar structures. Here, we present the
feed/deposit belt as an example.
With similar functionality and the same actuators and
sensors, the feed belt and the deposit belt share a compo-
nent implementation as shown in ﬁgure 12. This model
is borrowed from [8, 9] but ﬂattened and enhanced with
input/output ports. Each belt contains an actuator and
a sensor. The actuator is started or stopped by deposit-
ing a token into places “belt start” or “belt stop” (These
two places are complementary.) Transitions “trans Pstart”,
“trans Cstop” and “trans Pstop” model the process of con-
trolling the transportation of blanks from the beginning to
the end. Likewise, transitions “dlvr Pstart”, “dlvr Cstop”
and “dlvr Pstop” model the delivery process. Whether
a blank has reached or left the end of the belt is indi-
cated by markings of the places “light barrier false” and
“light barrier true” (These two should also be complemen-
tary.) The tokens in the places are only modiﬁed by the
sensor as a result of occurrences of transitions “trans csc”
and “dlvr csc”.
Initially, as shown in ﬁgure 12, the belt is idle and
stopped with one blank at the beginning. After it ﬁres
“lock input” and transports the blank to the end, the belt is
stopped and the light barrier is true. If the belt has received
a message via “Ofree” indicating the readiness of its neigh-
bouring component for loading, the belt proceeds to deliver
the blank. This involves sequential occurrences of delivery
transitions and the two unlocking transitions participating
in the producer-consumer protocol. As a result, two output
events “Ofull” and “Ifree” will be sequentially produced to
release locks in neighbouring components.
It is worth noting that some invariants are present in
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Figure 12. Feed/deposit belt component
this componentmodel, e.g. the complementary places noted
above. These can be ensured with purely local information,
while other invariants would require information on how the
environment behaves. The principle proposed in section 3
assumes the component has an environment that is as help-
ful as is deﬁned by the relevant IA. This allows us to prove
these invariants in the system as will be demonstrated in the
next section.
In designing the concrete robot, we distribute its actua-
tors and sensors into three components. “Arm1” and “arm2”
own actuators and sensors participating in arm extension,
blank grasp, and arm retraction, while “robot” manages
those engaged in robot swivel. Although their models tend
to be more complicated than the belt’s, a similar design ap-
proach can still be applied.
4.2. Modular analysis
To analyse the design, we have extended our work
in [14, 15] to handle mixed states in IAs, i.e. states where
both input and output events originate, e.g. state “s2” in ﬁg-
ure 10(a).
4.2.1. Consistency property
As stated previously, the consistency property refers to the
system’s freedom from deadlock and unexpected reception.
To check this, we apply the modular analysis approach pro-
posed in section 3. First of all, each component is checked
for conformance with its corresponding IA. This ensures
that the component does not break the guarantees speci-
ﬁed by the IA while constructing the component local state
space. This also ensures the deadlock freedom of the com-
ponent in the system. We have performed these checks us-
ing the Moses tool suite and proved the conformance of ev-
ery component in the design. The resultant component local
state spaces turn out to be small, as shown in table 1.
states transitions






Table 1. Component local state space
Secondly, an abstract system is constructed which is
composed of the IA in ﬁgure 10(a) and the full versions
of the IAs in ﬁgure 11 with the same synchronisation struc-
ture as shown in ﬁgure 9. The consistency of this system
is also ensured during the construction. The generated state
space turns to be much smaller than that of the component
system because we have abstracted away from the internal
activity of components. Table 2 shows the size of the two
system states transitions construction
time
Component 1,353,857 5,827,108 45.5 min
IA 692 1191 < 1 sec
Table 2. System state space
systems1. Clearly, this approach results in signiﬁcant reduc-
1The construction was executed in a SunOS 5.8 Ultra-2 machine
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tion of memory usage and time consumption.
4.2.2. More safety properties
In addition to the consistency property, there are also 21
safety requirements in the production cell design [8]. We
classify these into three catagories: component invariants,
system boundedness and system safety. Then we demon-
strate how to prove them from the previously built state
spaces.
Component invariants are predicates involving only
places in a single component. Examples include the
complementary places, the boundedness of places, the
movement constraints on components. For example, the
feed/deposit belt design requires complementary places,
e.g. “belt start” vs. “belt stop” and “light barrier true” vs.
“light barrier false” etc. Also, it is required that all places
in a component can have at most one token. Furthermore,
the robot is required not to rotate clockwise if its ﬁrst arm
points towards the table and not to rotate anticlockwise if its
ﬁrst arm points towards the press.
As stated previously, the invariants that hold in compo-
nent local state spaces also hold in the system. To prove
these invariants in the system, we only need to check the
local state space of the component. We have checked all
component invariants of the above-mentioned kinds in the
design, including seven restrictions on component mobility
given in [8]. They were found to be true in the respective
component local state spaces. Hence they also hold in the
system.
System boundedness refers to the boundedness of all
places in the system. Since the boundedness of every sin-
gle place can be proved as described above, we can prove
that this property holds in our production cell design and the
ﬂattened net of the whole system is a 1-safe Petri net.
System safety refers to properties involving places in two
or more components. These include 4 requirements for
collision avoidance, 5 requirements inhibiting blanks being
dropped outside the safe area, and 5 requirements ensuring
sufﬁcient distance between blanks [8]. We have observed
that all these properties can be expressed in the following
form or the conjunction of terms of this form:
A =⇒ B,
where A involves only places in one component and B in-
volves only places in another component. For example, it is
equipped with dual 200MHZ CPU and 768MB memory. The state space
of the component system is generated by the Maria tool [19] and that of
the abstract system is by the Moses tool.
required that the feed belt conveys a blank through its light
barrier only if the table is stopped in the loading position
and not already loaded. This requirement can be expressed
in the above form, where:
A = f.belt start ∧ (f.dlvr run ∨ f.dlvr rs), (1)
B = t.load angle ∧ t.bottom pos (2)
∧ t.stop horizontal ∧ t.stop vertical (3)
∧ ¬ t.pIfull. (4)
Here, f and t refer to the feed belt and the table, respec-
tively. We also use place names to represent the existence
of a token in the place, because the system is a 1-safe net.
Line 1 indicates that a blank is being delivered. Line 2 states
that the table is in the loading position. Line 3 suggests that
both the actuators in charge of horizontal rotation and ver-
tical movement of the table are stopped. Finally, line 4 im-
plies that the table is not already loaded, where t.pIfull is
the successor place connected with port “Ifull” of the table
and ¬ t.pIfull means the absence of tokens in the place.
To prove these properties, we follow a four-step proce-
dure:
1. Check the local state space of the feed belt component
againstA and calculate a setQ of states whereA holds.
The states are tuples 〈s, q〉, where s a state of the feed
belt IA and q is a marking of the component net. Note
that the IA refers to ﬁgure 10(a).
2. Obtain a subset S of states of the belt IA such that
S = {s | 〈s, q〉 ∈ Q}.
3. Compute a set S′ of states in the table IA which are
associated with a state in S in the state space of the ab-
stract system of IAs, while disregarding states of other
constituent IAs.
4. We can then prove the property if B holds in every
state 〈s′, q′〉 in the local state space of the table com-
ponent for s′ ∈ S′.
We have extended our previous work in [14, 15] and
proved the correctness of this method. Using this method,
we have successfully proved the above-mentioned 14 safety
requirements.
5. Conclusion
We have informally presented a component-based design
and analysis methodology. This uses interface automata
(IAs) to capture the input-output protocol for each compo-
nent, and employs a divide and conquer approach where
components are tested for conformance with corresponding
IAs, and the network of IAs (which matches the network of
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components) is checked for consistency. This, together with
abstraction from the data values transmitted between com-
ponents, leads to a signiﬁcant reduction in the state space to
be explored. In the case of the production cell case study
which was presented in this paper, there is no abstraction of
transmitted data since the system is modelled by a black-
token Petri net. Still, the technique resulted in approxi-
mately three orders of magnitude improvement in the size
of the state space.
We have also shown how the component-based approach
can be extended to the veriﬁcation of various safety proper-
ties, particularly those which can be expressed in the form
(or a conjunction of terms of the form): A =⇒ B where A
involves only places in one component and B involves only
places in another component. Essentially, the technique in-
volves abstracting from the local component states satisfy-
ing A, determining the possible matching global states, pro-
jecting these global states into abstract local states for the
second component, determining the matching local com-
ponent states, and checking whether these states satisfy
B. This technique was applied to the production cell case
study, and was able to verify all 21 safety requirements
posed in an earlier paper.
It is worth noting that, although the safety requirements
studied above involve only two neighbouring components
at a time, a similar approach can be taken to verify sys-
tem safety properties involving multiple components. This
will generalise A and B to be a conjunction and disjunc-
tion of component local safety properties, respectively. A
detailed presentation of this work is currently being writ-
ten for further publication. On the other hand, due to the
over-approximation of IAs from components, it is possible
for this approach to give false negatives. In this case, a pro-
cess of progressive reﬁnement will need to be adopted, as
advocated in [4].
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